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On the Islamic authority
of the Indonesian state:
responsibility, suspicion,
and acts of compliance
Nicholas J. Long London School of Economics and Political Science
This article examines how the Indonesian state’s efforts to style itself as an Islamic authority have
influenced the behaviour of its Muslim citizens. I present cases in which Muslims in Indonesia’s Riau
Islands comply with Islamic state directives in order to transfer responsibility for their actions to the
state, showing how such a mode of practice can support Islamic governmentality, bolster nationalism,
and constrain civic activism. Interestingly, compliance may occur even when citizens harbour deep
misgivings towards a directive, leading me to query whether suspicion is necessarily inimical to
authority. I conclude that a pronouncement’s Islamic authority hinges on how Muslims relate to their
suspicions regarding it, and that, for Riau Islanders, suspicion’s urgency has been tempered by cultural
models of personhood, individual subjectivity, and the moral murk of post-Suharto Indonesia.
Fast forward
It was the Ramadan my informants would never forget.
Ayu had been cooking all Monday.1 The daughter of two Javanese migrants to
Tanjung Pinang, the capital of Indonesia’s borderland Riau Islands province, Ayu was
a cheerful lady who was relishing the chance to showcase her culinary skills. Pots full of
rich beef stew nestled alongside bowls of fragrant chicken curry whilst piles of freshly
boiled ketupat stood steaming nearby. These ketupat – soft dumplings made by boiling
rice in small baskets woven out of palm leaves – represented hours of work. Every
basket had been painstakingly created by Ayu, her 18-year-old daughterWulan, and her
husband Baqir.
It was Indonesia’s final day of Ramadan, which meant the end to an exhausting
month of fasting and the arrival of the long-awaited Idul Fitri holiday, known popularly
as Lebaran (literally, ‘widening’) – the whole point of which, one housewife explained,
was ‘to eat as much as you like without worrying about any kind of restraint’. In a
complex schedule of visits, Riau Islanders would drop in on the homes of family and
friends, where they would be enjoined to sample the host’s curries and ketupat, or, for
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 23, 709-726
C© 2017 The Authors Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd on behalf of Royal Anthropological Institute
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
710 Nicholas J. Long
less intimate acquaintances, cookies and soft drinks, vast supplies of which had been
prepared in advance. The delicious taste of fresh food was one of the greatest pleasures
of the celebrations.
Myhostswere not especially religious –Ayuhadno appetite for adjudicating between
different varieties of Islam, saying that she ‘went along with anything that’s good’, while
Wulan claimed her mother was ‘the only one in the house who takes religion seriously’.
Nevertheless, everyone had been fasting, Baqir was going regularly to the mosque, and
theywere all looking forward to Lebaran. Zaki, Ayu’s youngest child, had just completed
his first ever full month of fasting and ran around the house chanting ‘It’s Lebaran
tomorrow!’ whilst 12-year-old Sami entertained us with an impassioned pastiche of the
Qur’anic reader on the radio. Then, boom! The sound of cannons announced that the
fast could be broken. Sami gulped down a glass of water and beamed as he told me that
‘we don’t have to fast again for a whole year!’ Before long he was trying to impress Uncle
Yus – Baqir’s older brother – with tales of girls and the stupidity of the neighbourhood
imam.
Yetmerriment subsided as the televisionbeganbroadcasting live from theMinistry of
Religion’s Jakarta headquarters. TheMinistry was holding a meeting known as a sidang
isbat to confirm that the month of Ramadan had indeed ended and that the newmonth
of Syawal had begun. We initially paid little attention to the complex astronomical
charts being shown on the screen. We fell silent, however, as the first cleric to speak, a
representative of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU),
recommended that Lebaran be postponed until Wednesday.
Schools of Islam diverge sharply on the question of how to determine an Islamic
calendar. The NU uses the principle of rukyatul hilal, attributed to the Prophet, which
stipulates that a new month begins when the new moon is sighted. But the criteria for
lunar visibility are themselves contested, with groups setting different thresholds for the
width of the lunar crescent, its brightness, and its height in the sky. In 2011 (1432H in
the Islamic calendar) the NU considered themoon too low, not meeting their threshold
of two degrees above the horizon. Two observation stations, in Central Java and East
Jakarta, had reported the moon being higher, but the NU representative argued these
anomalous sightings should be disregarded. ‘Ha!’ shouted Baqir at the television, ‘as if
degrees would havemattered in the days of the Prophet! You either see the moon or you
don’t!’ But the next three speakers all agreed with the NU: postpone until Wednesday.
A cleric dressed in white, with a long flowing beard, was next to take the floor. ‘He’s
a bearded man (orang jenggot)’, commented Wulan dismissively, ‘He’ll be fanatical’.
Yet when the speaker suggested the anomalous Javanese sightings should be upheld
given that everyone had prepared for Tuesday celebrations, Wulan was the first to cheer
him on: ‘He’s bearded, but he talks sense!’ The representative ofmodernist organization
Muhammadiyah also attracted a cheer from the family for reiterating Baqir’s suggestion
that a preoccupation with astronomical angles was anachronistic, and for endorsing
a calculationist method (hisab) which placed Lebaran on the Tuesday. Every other
speaker, however, agreed that Lebaran should be postponed.
Having sought input from the sidang isbat’s participants, it fell toMinister of Religion
Suryadharma Ali to announce the final government edict (keputusan). Noting that ‘the
majority of commentators had agreed’ that Lebaran should fall on the Wednesday
and that Muhammadiyah, despite ‘asking for permission to celebrate on Tuesday’, still
‘respected and valued’ the former view, Suryadharma could ‘conclude very clearly’ that
Syawal 1432H would not begin until Wednesday. The meeting participants chorused
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their assent. Suryadharma struck his gavel to confirm the decision and then with a
grimace (or was it a smirk?) turned his eyes from the camera.
In Tanjung Pinang, stunned silence gripped the room.
‘Well, that proves our country is under the thumb of the NU’. Baqir was the first to
break the quiet. Hewas certain this was about inter-organizational politics, not religion.
Sami spoke next, pleading with his mother as she looked impassively at the screen. ‘Ma,
I don’t want to fast again, Ma! Please, Ma! Let’s join Muhammadiyah, Ma!’ Wulan
proposed a family vote. Uncle Yus suggested we celebrate early, as Ayu had already
cooked.
At this Ayu gave a huge, terrible laugh. ‘Everyone has cooked!’ she said, her voice
trembling with emotion. ‘TheMinister was smiling’, she added quietly, ‘he was laughing
at us after he used that gavel!’ She took a deep breath. ‘Right’, she announced, ‘onemore
day of fasting. What else can we do? We have to follow the government’.
Authority, suspicion, and ethical infrastructure
I use this Ramadan scene,whichwas echoed in households across the town, as a starting-
point from which to make contributions to three fields of anthropological debate.
The first concerns the basis of state authority. Ayu – like most Riau Islanders –
disputed the compassion, political motivations, and theological soundness of
Suryadharma’s edict. Yet she ‘had to follow the government’.Why?What leads citizens to
defer to state authority against their better judgement? Anthropologists have typically
approached such puzzles via two lines of explanation, either emphasizing the state’s
capacity to punish and seeing compliance as motivated by citizens’ fear (e.g. Hansen
& Stepputat 2006), or emphasizing citizens’ affective and psychic attachments to a
state they know to be causing them harm (e.g. Navaro-Yashin 2002). Yet neither of
these arguments quite rings true for thematerials in hand. Fast-breaking is not illegal in
Indonesia; we could have eatenwith impunity. And it is hardly as if Riau Islanders always
went along with state directives. Many habitually ignored them, citing inconvenience
or their conviction that state personnel were incompetent or corrupt. So why should
Suryadharma’s edict – out of all state directives – prove so compelling? My answer is
that the edict exemplified a distinctive modality of state power that arises when citizens
envision the state and its personnel as Islamic authorities.
Theoretically, my approach follows scholars who have emphasized that the way
the state is felt and thought about by citizens helps determine the authority it is able
to wield (e.g. Aretxaga 2006; Rutherford 2012). Citizens, of course, can tack between
multiple ways of envisioning the state at any moment in time. Riau Islanders did not
always envision the state as an Islamic authority, and nor was the state the only Islamic
authority in their lives. Having identified this Islamicmode of state authority, however, I
quickly began to appreciate just howpervasive it actually was. The realization opened up
interpretative possibilities that would have been occluded had I solely used theoretical
frameworks derived from studies of secular states to analyse my material.
My second contribution is to the anthropology of religious authority, Islamic
authority in particular. As Foucault (2007: 168) has argued, religious authorities and
their followers can be bound together by ‘extremely complex and subtle relationships
of responsibility’. He describes how, in the early Christian church, pastors and their
congregations acted within an ‘economy of merit and fault’ characterized by a
principle of ‘exhaustive and instantaneous transfer’: whenever a Christian behaved
sinfully, fault accrued not only to them but also to their religious leader, the pastor
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(2007: 167-73). Other religious and philosophical traditions, of course, may not share
early Christianity’s conceptions of ‘merit’ and ‘fault’ (Fu¨rer-Haimendorf 1974); nor
are they necessarily characterized by the same principles of transfer. Nevertheless,
they have their own ethical infrastructures – a term I have developed as a heuristic
for thinking through my material. It draws on the sense of ‘infrastructure’ as the
underlying frameworkof a systemandrefers to,withinanygiven tradition, theprinciples
that determine what is generated, ethically speaking, and for whom, when actions
take place in the world. Ethical infrastructures warrant close, comparative study by
anthropologists because of their differential implications for social and political life.
For example, relationships in which responsibility can be shared or transferred have
profoundly different stakes to those in which participants are not ethically affected
by each other’s behaviour. They may thus unfold in a different manner. Foucault’s
(2007: 180-4) work demonstrates this well: early Christian relations were characterized
by an intense, individualizing ‘pastoral power’, the principle of exhaustive and
instantaneous transfer leading pastors to supervise all the activities of their flock in
order to secure their own prospects of salvation (for further examples, see Laidlaw 2014:
179-212). Similarly, I argue that the ethical infrastructures of Indonesian Islam have a
crucial bearing on how Riau Islanders relate to the state as an Islamic authority.
The extensive interdisciplinary literature on Islamic authority has to date focused
primarily on the means by which various state and non-state actors establish their
legitimacy and credibility within both national and global public spheres (see, e.g.,
Kloos & Ku¨nkler 2016; Metcalf 1984; Volpi & Turner 2007). Only a few anthropologists
have commented on the ethical infrastructures undergirding relationships between
Islamic authorities and their followers, typically doing so rather fleetingly (e.g. Buitelaar
1993: 88-91; Khosravi 2011: 24-6). The exception is Agrama (2012), who has made a truly
pathbreaking contribution by articulating a theory of Islamic authority that places
questions of ethical infrastructure at its very heart.
Having conductedfieldwork in twoEgyptian state institutions that issuedirectives on
family affairs such as inheritance and divorce, Agrama observed a curious discrepancy.
Judgments citing Sharia texts in Egypt’s personal status courts were viewed with great
suspicion; litigants rarely obeyed them in the absence of coercion. The opposite was true
of the fatwas (legal opinions) issued at Cairo’s Al-Azhar Mosque, which also derived
from the Sharia. Even when questioners did not get the decision they were hoping for,
they generally followed the fatwa, confident it would help thembecome an idealMuslim
self.
For Agrama (2012: 184), the fatwa’s authority hinges on ‘the careful allocation of
responsibility’. Imagine that following a fatwa leads somebody to commit sinful acts.
If this happens because the questioner has misrepresented the facts of the situation,
then full responsibility for the sin rests with them; the mufti is absolved of blame. The
situation is reversed if the sin results from a jurisprudential error on the mufti’s part.
Such a demarcation of responsibility – afforded by the ethical infrastructure of Egyptian
Islam – means there is no reason for either party to worry whether the other has made
an error or has lied, resulting in ‘comparatively little suspicion . . . even in cases where
[legal]manipulation seems evident’ (2012: 34).Muftis and questioners thus forge ‘strong
bonds’, and a ‘measure of trust’ secures the fatwa’s authority (2012: 184). In the personal
status courts, by contrast, a hyper-vigilance against abuses of power, characteristic of
liberal legal thought, leads to suspicion that the Sharia itself may have been subject to
manipulation by judges, stripping verdicts of their Islamic authority (2012: 126-59).
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Agrama’s insights into how pronouncements acquire or lose Islamic authority
offers a valuable starting-point for investigating why Riau Islanders might comply
with Islamic state edicts. The allocation of responsibility, as I will show, figures
prominently in Indonesians’ explanations of their actions. However, Agrama’s analysis
of the relationship between suspicion and authority warrants closer examination. He
is correct to argue that a ‘suspicious disposition’ towards authority is not a natural,
default state, but historically and culturally contingent (2012: 127). But he writes as if
suspicion, once present, is inherently inimical to authority, and not just in the liberal
space of the courts – his ethnography describes several questioners who feel ‘unsure’
about their fatwas, all of whom are driven by their suspicions to seek out a second fatwa
(2012: 117). Perhaps Egyptians never do follow Islamic pronouncements if they harbour
suspicions towards them. However, my Indonesian materials demonstrate clearly that
even liberal suspicion need not undermine Islamic authority. Suryadharma’s edict, for
instance, was viewed with tremendous suspicion by many of my informants – and yet
it still had ‘authority’ insofar as they acted upon it. Evidently, the Islamic authority of a
pronouncement depends not just on whether it elicits suspicion, but also how subjects
experience, make sense of, and respond to that suspicion. Yet it is on this issue that
Agrama’s work, focused as it is on the worlds of courts and fatwa councils rather than
the worlds of questioners and litigants, reaches its limit.
To develop his arguments further, I turn to ethnographic data drawn from over
thirty months of participant observation in Indonesia’s Riau Islands. Doing so allows
me to contribute to a final body of literature, concerning Indonesia’s cultural politics
of suspicion. Analyses of life during Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime, in
power from 1966 to 1998, have shown that the secrecy surrounding the often corrupt
and violent activities of state actors became a source of ‘unending rumors’; stories
of scandal, conspiracy, and counterfeiture were ‘voraciously invented and consumed’
(Steedly 2013: 264; see also Siegel 1998: 52-65). Indonesia’s subsequent democratization
sparked such a proliferation of competing political interests, and such journalistic
commitment to exposing wrongdoings, that public suspicion skyrocketed even further
(see, e.g., Bubandt 2014; Gibbings 2013; Strassler 2009). As my informants often
lamented, politicians could not be trusted, but nor could the activists or journalists
who questioned them, who might easily be in the service of rival elites. Everything had
become ‘murky’ (gelap).
Yet although the existing literature successfully accounts for contemporary
Indonesia’s ‘crisis of credibility’ (Strassler 2009: 40), a lack of attention to the lived
experience of suspicion has prevented Indonesianists from fully appreciating what is at
stake in its proliferation. This is regrettable given that, as this article shows, suspicion
can have significant but sometimes counterintuitive social and political ramifications.
After a brief historical overview of the Indonesian state’s claims to Islamic authority, I
show how Riau IslandMuslims’ conceptions of personhood and consciousness interact
with locally dominant conceptions of how responsibility can be allocated to generate a
situation in which suspicion fails to diminish the state’s Islamic authority and instead
sustains it.
The Indonesian state as Islamic actor
Ever since Indonesia’s independence, the relationship between Islam and state has
been vexed. Although Muslim nationalists failed to make Indonesia constitutionally
Islamic,2 a Ministry of Religion was established in January 1946 at the behest of groups
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who wanted to protect Islamic institutions from ‘non-Islamically oriented’ bureaucrats
and politicians (Lev 1972: 44). The inauguralMinister,MuhammadRasjidi, emphasized
that theMinistry existed to guarantee citizens the freedom to practise their religions, not
to intervene in ‘internal religious affairs’ (Mujiburrahman 2006: 125-7). The Ministry
nevertheless had jurisdiction over Islamic courts, marriages, mosques, pilgrimages,
Islamic educational institutions, and the national curriculum for religious education.
While many Muslims welcomed the Ministry as ‘a critical foothold pending further
Islamization of Indonesia’, others had doubts – its positionwas anomalous in traditional
doctrine and it appeared to legitimize a non-Islamic state (Lev 1972: 47). Controversy
therefore broke outwhen, in 1952, theMinistry assumed authority over the appointment
of wali-hakim (ritual guardians) for brides whose closest male kin were not available.
Local religious officials condemned this as state interference in religious affairs. To
counter such accusations, the Ministry convened a conference of ulamas (Islamic
scholars) in 1953, where it was noted that appointing wali-hakim would ideally be
the task of a caliph or sultan – i.e. an Islamic leader – or his nominated delegates.
‘Even though President Soekarno was not a sultan in the meaning of the Sjariah’, the
conference declared, ‘he was clearly the ruler of Indonesia and could therefore delegate
authority to appoint wali-hakim to the Minister of Religion’ (Lev 1972: 49). A 1954
conference then ‘stated definitively that the President, Cabinet, Parliament, and so
forth constituted a Waliyul Amri Daruri bi Ssjaukah . . . the highest leadership of the
Islamic community’ (1972: 50). Though some protested, the institutions of the state had
been ratified as Islamic authorities.
Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime came to power in 1966. It violently
suppressed the political left and took measures to stifle the threat of Islam becoming
a future wellspring of opposition, wresting control of the Ministry of Religion from
organized Islam, subjecting quotidian Islamic practices to ever-increasing degrees of
state regulation, and attempting to curtail the role of Islamic institutions in public life
(Cammack 1997: 150-1). Not until the early 1990s, as Suharto’s military support began to
dwindle, did the President develop a more collaborative relationship with the Muslim
community, securing him much-needed backing, and offering devout Indonesians an
opportunity to infuse state governance with Islamic ideals (Hefner 1997).
The rapprochement coincided with a new phase in the NewOrder’s control of Islam.
Rather than seeking to repress Islamic institutions, state actors – chiefly the Supreme
Court and the Ministry of Religion – now specified the very principles upon which
Islamic institutions could operate. Perhaps the clearest example is the 1991Compilation
of Islamic Laws, a text that detailed the core principles to which judges should adhere
in Sharia courts (Bowen 2003). Publishing the Compilation was theologically radical:
political figures were intervening inmatters – such as the interpretation of Islamic law –
which had previously been outside their jurisdiction, thereby positioning themselves as
authoritative interpreters of the religious tradition (Cammack 1997: 167). What on one
level appears to be an ‘Islamization’ of governance was thus on another level a political
subversion of Islamic epistemological principles (Moustafa 2014). And it was one that
upheld the state’s legitimacy as an Islamic authority.
Challenges to that authority have resurfaced in the post-Suharto period, with liberal
circles questioning the state’s involvement in Islamic affairs and theMUI (MajelisUlama
Indonesia, or Indonesian Ulama Council) asserting its independence from the state, of
which it was once a self-styled defender (Assyaukanie 2008; Ichwan 2005). Nevertheless,
public support for the Ministry of Religion remains strong (Assyaukanie 2008: 14).
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Moreover, in recent years, the spectre of radical Islamism has prompted many Muslim
intellectuals and politicians to declare on record that the President and state apparatus
represent an ulil amri, or supreme Islamic authority. In 2014, the chair of the NU even
announced to the organization’s annual meeting that newly elected President Joko
Widodo was ‘the Indonesian people’s caliph’ (Antara News 2014). Similar views were
widespread in Tanjung Pinang, where they were repeatedly disseminated in mosques
and study groups; the idea of a government’s Islamic authority seeming as self-evident
tomany informants as the nation-state system itself. What this means, then, is that state
personnel were also seen as embedded in the ethical infrastructures of locally dominant
Islamic traditions – with crucial implications for how my informants related to them.
Riau Islands Islam
In 2011, Tanjung Pinang was home to just under 200,000 residents, of whom 78 per cent
identified as Muslim (BPS 2016). Like many parts of Indonesia, it has witnessed an
explosion of Islamic public culture since the late 1980s (see Brenner 2011; Fealy &White
2008; Jones 2010). That is not to say that all, or evenmost, Riau IslandMuslims support
the specific forms of Islam promoted by Indonesia’s Islamic movement. Membership
of reformist organizations remains low,3 the Sharia has not been incorporated into
municipal byelaws, andmost ofmy informants, likeAyu, expressed reluctance to affiliate
themselves with any Islamic organizations, saying they preferred simply ‘to follow
anything that’s good’. Nevertheless, the growing attention given to Islam in politics, the
media, and everyday life has rendered the religion an object of interest and concern
for many Riau Islanders, who increasingly understand themselves as individualized
Muslim subjects, their fates – in this world and the next – in their own hands (see also
Mittermaier 2013; Peletz 2002).
It is difficult to give a ‘typical account’ of Riau Islands Islam. Although the region’s
autochthonous Malays have long been Muslim, its access to Singapore (and hence
Singaporean currency) has attracted economic migrants from across Indonesia ever
since Independence. Residents of Tanjung Pinang have thus often been exposed to
quite different Islamic traditions from each other. There were, nevertheless, certain
principles upon which they were broadly agreed. I outline these briefly here, not to
either challenge or replicate the extensive work on Indonesian metaphysics conducted
by other anthropologists (e.g. Peletz 1996; Retsikas 2012; Simon 2014), but to indicate
how Riau Island Muslims’ understanding of themselves, and of the world, led them to
engage with Islamic authorities, and their own suspicion, in distinctive ways.
Sinning, moral perception, and responsibility
The little sins that we commit unawares: getting cross, acting spitefully, speaking ill of somebody.
They all add up.
Malay schoolteacher
Riau IslandMuslims frequently remarked that they were takut dosa – scared of sinning,
or of having sinned. They had good reason to be. Misdeeds during one’s lifetime would
be evaluated at the end of the world, and could jeopardize one’s prospects of being
accepted into paradise. Even in those cases where acceptance was said to be ‘guaranteed’
– because, say, the deceased had spoken the testimony of faith (syahadat) as their last
words – a lifetime’s misdeeds would still be punished, angels descending every night to
torture deceased sinners as they lay in their graves. Consequently, much time and effort
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was devoted to avoiding and atoning for sins, and also acquiring merit (pahala), said to
be capable of ‘cancelling sins out’. Although religious discourses in circulation within
the Riau Islands stressed the possibility of perfectibility, stimulating some Muslims to
embark on a path of intense ethical self-cultivation similar to that witnessed in Cairo by
Mahmood (2005: 45-6), most of my informants simply focused on keeping the budget
of their actions in the black. This was an anxious pursuit. They could not be sure how
harshly God would weigh their sinful actions, and knew that some sins could wipe out
a lifetime’s accumulated merit (see also Mittermaier 2013: 284-5). Better, they said, to
avoid sin whenever possible.
Doing so required learning how to identify when morally ambiguous actions were
sinful, and indeed when seemingly innocuous actions would put one on a path on
which sinning became inevitable. Abdul, a Malay entrepreneur, encountered the latter
problem in 2014. Shortly before the presidential election, a campaigner offered him
500,000Rp (US$24, the equivalent of a week’s profits from his laundry business) in
exchange for his vote. At the time, Abdul heard a ‘whispering’ (bisikan) telling him, ‘Go
on, take it. Why not?’ And so he did. But a few days later he ‘discovered information’
about the campaigner’s candidate that meant he could no longer countenance voting
for him. Abdul declined to reveal what he had learned, but insisted it was enough to
know that if he voted for theman, and –worse still – played a role in his victory, it would
be a serious sin. Yet breaking his promise to the campaigner would also be sinful. What
could he do? Ultimately he decided to abstain, hoping that sincere repentance would
stop this sin being held too strongly against him, but he still felt wretched. Taking the
money had not, in itself, been sinful (or so he claimed), but it had left him trapped in
an invidious position. He should never have listened to the encouraging whispers. His
moral perception had failed him.
Almost all Riau Island Muslims agreed that moral perception, along with capacities
such as reason, desire, and emotion, was a faculty of the ‘spirit’ (usu. jiwa, but also
batin, or hati). Although the precise structure and function of this ‘spirit’ was hotly
debated, the importance of accurate moral perception compelled my informants to
develop provisional models with which to navigate daily life. They spoke of their
wakeful states as a stream of conflicting impulses, feelings, and ‘whisperings’. These had
several sources. Thefirstwas the ‘psychosocial development’ (perkembangan psikososial)
of an individual’s personality. Numerous tales of spoiled, traumatized, and deviant
individuals revealed my informants to believe that spiritual animation was, at least
in part, forged by relationships and the experiences one had lived through, rendering
psychodynamics a primary source of emotions (emosi), feelings (rasa), and desires
(nafsu), although some of these (hunger, aggression, libido) were also attributed to
naluri – the animalistic instincts and appetites common to all creatures.
Whispers also came from entities within. Human beings, Riau Islanders explained,
were organisms that were both composite and permeable. The malign forces of Satan
(Iblis) and his army of demons (se´tan) could circulate in the bloodstream, conjuring
up multisensory illusions that distorted their hosts’ perceptions of reality and spurred
them to sinful action. Zikri, a motivational speaker, framed the issue differently. In
his view, which also enjoyed widespread currency in town, the spirit itself was ‘held’
(dipegang) by four angels and four devils. Thus in any given situation, any one of the
eight could be influencing one’s thoughts. Zikri himself suspected these angels and
devils could directly provoke impulses within human consciousness; others argued that
feelings and desires emerged from a person’s psychosocial development and the angels
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and devils would then offer ‘whispers’ advising as to whether or not such impulses
should be acted upon.
A final source of whispers came from the hati nurani (literally, ‘illuminated heart’,
but widely translated as ‘conscience’ or ‘heart of hearts’), a distinct organ within
the spirit which offered advisory whispers on the correct course of action. Widya,
a Javanese businesswoman, described it as ‘a large organ, the most powerful part of
which is an “eye”, through which divine insight (ilham) flows from God into the
human spiritual plane’. The hati nurani ‘filtered’ (menyaring) impulses and thoughts
by sounding whispers that served as an ‘alarm’ (alaram) if someone considered actions
that would lead them down an immoral path. As Widya made plans for a new branch
of her business, doubts began to plague her. Where would she get the money? If she
had to borrow it, could she pay off the debts in a timely fashion? Shouldn’t she be using
her spare cash to help the poor? These, she realized, were all alarms sounded by her
hati nurani. Though she could still act on her initial desires, she would be wrong to
do so: the alarm was coming directly to her from God. Yet as Fadli, a Minangkabau
schoolteacher, explained, too many misdeeds could cause the hati nurani to become
‘dirty and diseased . . . just like the hearts of people who have eaten too much fatty
food’, further compounding the difficulty of moral perception.
With all these different feelings andwhispers circulating in their consciousnesses, and
the stakes of sin being so high, Riau Islanders often struggled to decide which whispers
and impulses they should heed. Some undertook training designed to heighten their
powers of moral perception: a long-standing theme of Sufist and Javanese mysticism
finding new life in expensive programmes that promised to ‘unshackle’ the centre of
human spirituality – no longer called the hati nurani but rather the ‘God Spot’ – and
facilitate correct moral judgements (Rudnyckyj 2009: 121-2). For those unwilling or
unable to devote themselves to extensive training, other strategies could be deployed.
Seeking counsel from friends, family, or a religious teacher (ustadz) often made
matters clearer. By bringing their own moral perceptions to bear on the dilemma, such
consultants afforded a kind of triangulation. Another strategy was to take one’s time
in making a decision. Abdul, still shaken by the experience of selling his vote, reflected
that his error had lain in how hastily he had responded to the whispering he had heard.
He had allowed no time for the hati nurani to filter his consciousness effectively. He
usually avoided acting immediately, instead researching all possible factors and turning
them over in his head for consideration, hoping that the hati nurani would eventually
become the loudest whisper and point him in the right direction; Abou El Fadl (2009:
132) labels this ‘conscientious pause’. Yet as Abdul noted, although consultation and
deliberation reduced the risk of acting on devilish whispers, they did not eliminate it.
Zikri agreed, concluding it was often best not to act at all:
If there’s no need, don’t act! This problem of interpreting the spirit is why we [Muslims] don’t create
pictures of God. Don’t get me wrong – God is all around us, in everything. But that can be hard to
grasp, so it helps to imagine him as a personified figure. That’s OK. But to draw his face? No! How
could we be sure whether what we drew came from an angel within us or a devil? Better to have no
images of God at all. No need to make a drawing, no need to take that risk.
A final strategy involved not the avoidance of action so much as the avoidance – or
rather the referral – of decision. Riau Islanders explained that they could be voided of
responsibility for their actions if they followed the directions of a person or entity who
hadmade an Islamic pronouncement on their behalf. Instead, the authority would ‘take
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responsibility’ (menanggung) for the actions, and any fault that might accrue. This was
an ethical infrastructure in which the upward transfer of responsibility was possible.
Individual Muslims, however, remained free to disregard such pronouncements – in
which case, my informants said, their actions would be a matter ‘between them and
God’. For Zikri, this agentive, optional form of submission proved his religion was
not ‘authoritarian’, as he feared some Westerners might think. ‘It’s semi-authoritarian
(semi-otoriter)’, he explained. ‘Islam is all about responsibility. Nobody is forced;
we choose whether or not to follow’. And yet the ‘choice’ often seemed inevitable,
precipitated by the metaphysical uncertainties outlined above.
Riau Islanders could transfer responsibility in any context considered a matter of
Islamic jurisprudence – a field classically divided into matters of ibadah (worship) and
muamalat (everyday life; social intercourse). Thus, my informants explained how every
time they went to the mosque, they were in fact transferring responsibility to their
imam (prayer leader). Should prayers be misspoken or forbidden ritual procedures
introduced, the imam took all responsibility. A similar dynamic inheredwhen following
pronouncementsmade by Islamic authorities inmatters ofmuamalat. These range from
fatwas issued by ulamas and the verdicts of Islamic courts to the guidance provided
by the Ministry of Religion’s on-line Sharia consultation portal. They also include
halal certification, something for which Ayu once casually remarked she was ‘grateful’.
She said it allowed her to shop with confidence. Importantly, though, this did not
mean she was confident that certified products only included ingredients that were
permissible under Islamic law. It was a confidence that she could act as if they did and
not be committing a sin if forbidden substances had entered the product unnoticed –
responsibility for her consumption would be transferred to the certifiers.
Transfer of responsibility is not always a solution to moral quandaries. It violates
what reformists consider the ‘core Shari‘a value’ that ‘no one can be called to answer for
the sins of another’ (AbouEl Fadl 2009: 137);Muhammadiyahmembers thus denied that
it was even possible. And some dilemmas, like Widya’s prospective business expansion,
fall outside the purview of Islamic jurisprudence – one can only receive advice, the
Islamic authority of which hinges on such factors as the speaker’s scholasticism,
charisma, genealogy, and social connections (Kloos & Ku¨nkler 2016: 483). Directives
on jurisprudential matters exert a different kind of authority. Compliance may be
motivated as much by the desire to abrogate responsibility as by trust or faith in the
edict’s veracity. Followers do not need to trust the directive or its source. They comply
because they distrust themselves to adjudicate a situation correctly, saddled as they are
with the hazy moral perception outlined earlier.
Ramadan revisited
Consider Ayu’s dilemma as she sat by the television, watching the devastating outcome
of the sidang isbat. It would be a serious sin to celebrate Lebaran while it was still
Ramadan. But it would also be a serious sin to continue fasting on Idul Fitri – a fact
clearly stated in the hadith of Abu Sa‘eed al-Khudri and on which Muslim scholars are
agreed. What was she to do?
All her instincts were telling her to celebrate immediately. Sami’s cries were tugging at
her heartstrings, begging her to spare him a further day of fasting. Having spent the day
cooking, she found herself persuaded by the argument that the efforts of the nation’s
housewives should factor into the Minister’s verdict, that compassion of this kind
would represent a good Islamic decision. Her husband’s dismissive attitude towards
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the NU also struck a chord: was Lebaran simply being delayed because of political
point-scoring between Islamic organizations? It seemed possible. And her friends and
relatives in Singapore and Malaysia were already celebrating. With those countries just
a few kilometres away, it seemed probable that the moon was already high enough
above the horizon for Riau Islanders to start feasting too. But was this her hati nurani
speaking, or a devil tempting her to follow a selfish and impious path? She couldn’t be
sure.
Few could. ‘Nobody in [our] house knew whether it would be a sin to celebrate’,
recounted Jefri, a youngmigrant fromLampung. ‘We decided it was better just to follow
the government’. Ayu had reached a similar conclusion. As she glumly explained on the
Tuesday she had expected to be Lebaran, ‘I’m used to following the government. If we
don’t, I don’t know what will happen . . . They’ve made a declaration in the name of
all the people of Indonesia. If there’s been a mistake, they will take responsibility for it’.
Ricky, a Batak journalist who had recently converted to Islam, was at the governor’s
office when the news broke. He had hoped that the governor, H.M. Sani, might defy
the Ministry of Religion and declare a local Lebaran, as had reputedly happened in the
East Javanese city of Surabaya. For days, my informants spoke enviously of how lucky
the Surabayans were to celebrate as expected without any anxiety, responsibility having
been transferred to their mayor. But it was not to be. ‘If anyone wants to celebrate
Lebaran tomorrow’, Sani had said, ‘that’s between them and God. But [the provincial
government] will stick to following the centre’. Sani would not forbid anyone from
celebrating, but nor would he tell them that they should. In fact, he had carefully
formulated his words so that he could not take responsibility for anything at all. Ricky
had been disappointed, but his friend Yanti was unsurprised. ‘Sani’s an elderly man
now’, she remarked. ‘He’ll be thinking of what comes next. After death. No way would
he take on the sins of a whole province’.4 The possibility of transferring responsibility,
as Yanti’s remarks implied, could influence not only how citizens behaved but also the
governance state actors were prepared to provide.
This material reveals a distinctive, Islamic, modality of state authority. It also shows
how Islamic authority can withstand the challenge of suspicion. In theory, suspicion
could trump even the authority of Islamic pronouncements – because the hati nurani
always reveals the morally correct course of action. Thus for all that Ayu appreciated
halal certification, she wouldn’t buy a certified product if she had a ‘strong feeling’ it
wasn’t halal. ‘If I ignore that feeling’, she explained, ‘the purchase becomes a matter
between me and God’. Intense or persistent doubt, the kind one could confidently
associate with the hati nurani, transformed the moral status of action, rendering the
transfer of responsibility impossible. Yet, as we have seen, it was in practice very difficult
to determine whether a whisper actually originated from the hati nurani – especially in
circumstances affording no opportunity for conscientious pause. Unsure what to do,
and unable to trust her own suspicions, Ayu complied with Suryadharma’s edict and
transferred responsibility to him.
Ricky’s hope that the provincial governor might step in as an alternative authority
to the Minister of Religion raises further questions. Which authorities can one transfer
responsibility to in any given situation?How are different authorities positioned relative
to each other? My non-Muhammadiyah informants were generally agreed that ‘the
government’ was the highest authority of them all – a stance that, as noted earlier,
is widespread in Indonesian public culture. Its prominence in Tanjung Pinang was
reinforced by three factors. Firstly, there was a relative absence of local Sufi masters
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and traditionalist Islamic boarding school leaders (kyai) who in some other parts of
Indonesia present themselves as alternative religious authorities, autonomous from
and sometimes opposed to the state. Secondly, high rates of recent migration and
a transient population had made it difficult for shared local traditions of non-state
religious authority to develop. Finally, the town’s twomost prominent religious figures –
HuzrinHood,headof theprovincialMUI, andSyahrul, imamof theMesjidRaya (Grand
Mosque) – hadboth takenprominent positions in local government and fully supported
the Ministry of Religion. By contrast, during recent fieldwork in Semarang Regency,
Central Java, rural villagers explained that Ministry of Religion officials rarely came
into the mountains; they would rather follow the edict of a local kyai than a remote
bureaucrat. Yet they would also happily follow Ministry guidelines on such matters as
prayer times, unless their kyai (or hati nurani) gave them reason to do otherwise. The
diversification and fragmentation of religious authority had not stopped the state being
relatable to as an Islamic authority by its citizens; it simply rendered such relationality
more fleeting and more contextually variable than in Tanjung Pinang.
The relative standing of different government authorities was often unclear,
reflecting widespread confusion over the respective jurisdictions of district and central
governments in the wake of Indonesia’s ongoing political decentralization. Uncertain
about how different government authorities were positioned vis-a`-vis each other in
everyday administrative matters, let alone in the ethical infrastructure undergirding
Islamic pronouncements, Riau Islanders agreed that, barring any alarms from the hati
nurani, they could follow national, provincial, or regional Islamic edicts without fear
of sinning.5 Had Sani declared an early Lebaran, then, many would have doubtless
followed his edict, turning the ambiguities of moral perception to their advantage in
order to stop their ketupat from going to waste.
The broader implications
The events of Ramadan 1432H rendered explicit a modality of authority that state
personnel can wield whenever they issue directives on matters that citizens consider
to fall within the purview of Islamic jurisprudence. This form of state power saturates
the lives of Riau Island Muslims. Most obviously, it is integral to the activities of the
Ministry of Religion, a notoriously corrupt state agency which Hooker (2008: 205)
deems ‘all-pervasive in Muslim affairs’, its procedures ‘a source of syariah’. It currently
oversees when and how citizens should pray, their pilgrimages to Mecca, marriages,
the calendar, the core principles of Islamic jurisprudence, and the curricula taught in
Islamic schools.Whenever Indonesians go alongwith its regulations and recommended
procedures – as most do on a daily basis – they transfer responsibility from themselves
to state employees, ratifying the Ministry as a legitimate Islamic authority on which
they can depend. Hence my friend Melly’s dark warning to a nephew with dreams of
becoming a civil servant: ‘God willing, you won’t work for the Ministry of Religion!
Imagine being responsible for everyone’s sins . . . ’.
The transfer of responsibility did not necessarily win the Ministry citizens’ support,
but it could shut down opposition. Early in my fieldwork, my neighbour Anton invited
me to watch the forthcoming Qur’anic Recitation Contest (MTQ) with him. ‘Actually,
I don’t agree with the MTQ’, he then added. ‘It’s not appropriate for people to compete
at Islam, for prizes to be given out. An exhibition would be better than a contest’. Many
Riau Islanders had such concerns; some even boycotted theMTQ for these reasons. But
not Anton. ‘The Ministry of Religion’s organizing it’, he explained, ‘so I’m happy to go’.
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Andgohedid, beaming as he enjoyed the contest’s festive atmosphere.Ministry backing,
whilst doing nothing to alleviate Anton’s substantive concerns, stopped his attendance
being problematic: since the Ministry had said Muslims could attend tournaments
where contestants compete at Islamic pursuits, theMinistry would take responsibility if
this was in fact sinful. We see here how the transfer of responsibility lets the Ministry of
Religion go about its business, propagating its preferred forms of Islamic self-formation.
But we also see how, in a world where moral perception is ambiguous, desire can strip
suspicion of its authority. Anton had doubts about the MTQ but, perhaps because of
the pleasures of the event, he disavowed these doubts, allowing MTQs to be a matter
on which he deferred to his government.
State Islamic authority could enable citizens to cultivate an ethic of nationalism.
Once the 1432H Lebaran festivities had finally begun, I joined Fadli, my Minangkabau
schoolteacher friend, for a celebratory evening coffee by the seaboard. He pointed to
the buttery curl that hung in the sky. ‘When I see how big and bright the moon is
tonight . . . Wah!’ He shook his head sadly. ‘I know that my government was wrong.
Lebaran should have been yesterday. But right or wrong, it’s my country [English used]’.
He paused. ‘Besides’, he added casually, ‘the government will be responsible for what’s
happened’. Whatever his thought processes had been after the sidang isbat, Fadli now
presented his decision to heed Suryadharma’s edict as an act of patriotic devotion
and not a source of regret; it was something of which he could feel proud. But as his
final remark reveals, this was easy nationalism. It carried no consequences – for him.
Transferring responsibility had allowed him to express his emotional attachment to the
nation-state with impunity.
Finally, state Islamic authority could influence civic activism. Zainal was a middle-
agedMalay renowned for his vitriolic critiques of the government. He attended political
demonstrations, he was pursuing a lawsuit against Tanjung Pinang municipality; civil
servants, he said, turned his stomach. I was therefore surprised when he explained why,
despite having joined his local branch of Muhammadiyah, he did not operationalize
modernist religious principles in his daily life:
Philosophically, I prefer Muhammadiyah’s version of Islam. It’s more scientific. The problem is that
our state is under the thumb of the NU. I have a country. I have to be loyal to it, right?! Whether I like
it or not, the government wins out, even though it’s wrong.
He elaborated by turning to an analogy:
In Islam, even when an imam is wrong, we go along with him, and he becomes responsible for any
sin. That’s just a miniature example of how important togetherness is. In Islam, the merit we get for
praying together is far greater than for praying alone. And in life generally, the more social we are, the
closer we are to God. So I’m loyal to the state, and the state gets my sins.
What motivated Zainal to follow the government, then, was not (just) a sense
of its supreme authority, nor (simply) nationalist sentiment, but an appetite for
‘togetherness’ – for the social and ethical benefits of acting in co-ordination with
other Indonesian Muslims.6 The transfer of responsibility allowed him to pursue this
end unflinchingly, even though it meant disregarding his own reformist inclinations. It
shaped other aspects of his political outlook too. He knew, for example, that there were
controversies over the death penalty – even the tax system. Did the state really have the
right to take someone’s money or life? ‘It’s not a case of whether or not I agree!’ he said
of capital punishment. ‘Since the state has implemented it, I must go along with it. If
it’s wrong, responsibility lies with the President (pemimpin)’.
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It surprised me to hear a well-known political firebrand talk in this way, but perhaps
it should not have. Zainal protested over problems with the correct and efficient
implementation of policies and laws that had already been decided, fighting hard for the
services to which he and others were entitled. But he showed little interest in evaluating
whether lawswere just, or inprotestingagainst them onprinciple.Deciding theprinciples
by which a state should be run was, for him, a religious matter, the consequences of
which were spiritual, and responsibility for which lay with state elites. As a citizen, it
was simply not his concern. Of course, not all Riau Islanders shared Zainal’s view that
policy decisions onmorally contentious issues werematters that fell within the purview
of Islamic jurisprudence; informants disagreed considerably on where the boundary
between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ aspects of governance should be drawn. But
even taken in isolation, Zainal’s case demonstrates the practical ramifications of a
citizen seeing ‘the state’ as an Islamic authority. For as well as influencing his religious
life, it determined the issues to which this charismatic and indefatigable campaigner
would devote his considerable energies.
Conclusion
In 1977, Benedict Anderson offered a provocative overview of how scholars at the
time had conceptualized the relationship between religion and politics. ‘We are so
accustomed to thinking . . . only of politicians using religion for political ends’, he
wrote, ‘that it is extremely hard for us to understand what politics might look like if we
could see it through religious eyes’. It was time, he argued, for analysts to ‘imagine the
possibility of religious people using politics for religious ends’ (1977: 21).
With anthropologists having convincingly argued that modernist state projects
are neither inevitably nor straightforwardly secular (see, e.g., Starrett 2010), such a
possibility now seems undeniable. Indeed, in recent decades, people of all faiths have
been turning to political institutions such as the law and the bureaucracy in order to
realize their visions of a more moral society (Comaroff 2009). Anthropologists have
repeatedly documented the use of biopolitical techniques and legal coercion to spur
citizens into conforming with norms of religious piety (e.g. Feener 2013; Khosravi
2011; Peletz 2015). It is clear from the ethnography that such developments have been
transformative of citizens’ lives.
Less frequently examined is the possibility that such developments might also be
transforming the ethical status of the state. Yet asmy Indonesianmaterials demonstrate,
a government legislating on religious matters affords both state personnel and citizens
opportunities to claim that the state is a religious actor. Such claims, moreover, can
transform the means by which, and the extent to which, state pronouncements secure
citizens’ compliance. They change the stakes of civil disobedience. Knowing when,
and to what effect, citizens see their governments as religious authorities is therefore
essential to fully understanding political life in settings that have witnessed an ‘infusion
of the sacred into governance’ (Comaroff 2009: 205).
My material also prompts several reflections on how best to theorize the religious
authority of both state and non-state actors, within and beyond Islamic traditions.
As Foucault (2007) recognized in his lectures on pastoral power, as Agrama (2012)
highlighted in his study of Egypt, and as my ethnography has demonstrated, the
principles by which responsibility is allocated within a particular religious tradition
(however that tradition has been locally interpreted and vernacularized) have crucial
implications for how subjects and authorities relate to each other. Essential though
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attention to such ethical infrastructure may be, though, it is insufficient for fully
understanding when and why specific pronouncements acquire religious authority.
We must also attend to suspicion-as-lived. Since most religious traditions consider it
possible for believers to be contacted directly by God (or gods), there is always a chance
that one’s suspicion is a message from the divine, and therefore that it might invalidate
the pronouncements of a worldly religious authority. Yet God tends to communicate
in mysterious ways, via dreams, visions, voices, whispers, and impulses that can also
be attributed to other sources. Consequently, there is also always a chance that one’s
suspicion is not divine in provenance, but a satanic temptation or a personal whim.
Thus, whereas Agrama’s (2012) comparison of Cairo’s personal status courts and Azhari
Fatwa Council led him to argue that the Islamic authority of a pronouncement hinges
on the context in which it is issued, and the relative degree of trust or suspicion that such
a context evokes, I contend that a pronouncement’s religious authority is determined
not just by the mere presence or absence of suspicion, nor even by the intensity of
suspicion it elicits, but rather by the ways in which any such suspicion is experienced
and interpreted.
Several factors shape how suspicion is lived. Locally dominant models of
personhood – ideas about what the ‘mind’ and ‘spirit’ are, and how they shape one’s
consciousness – provide the categories and criteria with which subjects can parse
their internal experiences, making it more or less difficult to discern suspicions that
should be heeded from those that should be ignored. A recent, stronger, version of this
argument posits that by inviting subjects to pay attention to mental events in different
ways, cultural discourses actually generate substantively different forms of ‘spiritual
experience’ for subjects to interpret (Cassaniti & Luhrmann 2014: S341). Differences in
cultural conceptions of the person could thus, partly, explain why suspicion appears to
have so little power amongst Riau Islanders (many of whom found it difficult ever to
be certain which impulses they could trust), whereas in some other settings intuition
constitutes a primary source of authoritative knowledge (see, e.g., Davis-Floyd & Davis
1996).
Yet ultimately, I suggest, it is citizens’ subjectivities – their individual anxieties, fears,
and desires – that lead them, consciously or unconsciously, to act on or disregard their
suspicions. We have seen how Ayu’s anxiety about sinning led her to avoid certified
halal food about which she harboured suspicions and yet, when confronted with an
unfamiliar, technical, and, to her, rather arbitrary decision on lunar visibility, to comply
with an edict she mistrusted; Anton, by contrast, disavowed his doubts about the MTQ
so as to enjoy its festive temptations. But whilst irreducibly individual, subjectivities
are not without their social and national histories. My informants’ disinclination to
heed their suspicions may in fact be symptomatic of the contemporary Indonesian
situation. Several anthropologists have suggested that Suharto’s dramatic resignation
after decades of authoritarian rule generated ‘rampant uncertainty about the conditions
and terms of locatedness and recognition’ (Spyer 2008: 37 n. 39), engendering, for some
Indonesians, an ‘incapacity to figure oneself’ (Siegel 2005: 124). A less state-centric
analysis would be that in the distinctive political atmosphere of post-Suharto Indonesia,
characterized at once by rampant suspicion and earnest hopes of democratic reform
(see Gibbings 2013), Indonesians are finding their moral perception to be painfully
imperfect. Many, like Abdul, have put their faith in something or someone that has
later been besmirched by rumour, or have doubted persons and institutions that have
subsequently been exonerated. Compared to relying on a demonstrably fallible faculty
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of suspicion, transferring responsibility offers a comforting certainty, especially if doing
so allows one to indulge normative political fantasies of nationalistic togetherness and
citizenly obedience. Alternative political and economic conditions may foster quite
different relationships to suspicion. For example, as Wikan (1980) argued in her classic
ethnography of Cairo, when faced with intense competition for scarce resources, people
may learn to depend on their suspicion to avoid the ever-present dangers of exploitation
and betrayal, and consequently be disinclined to give anyone or anything the benefit
of the doubt. Indeed, if Wikan’s argument on this point still holds true, we can see
how Agrama’s own pathbreaking analysis of Islamic authority might be enhanced by
paying greater attention to subjectivity: the tremendous authority suspicion exercised
in his informants’ lives could derive not just from liberalism’s vigilance against abuses
of power, but also from the distinct modes of relating-to-self that arose during the
decades of poverty that Egyptians endured under the Nasser and Mubarak regimes.
These reflections point to one final conclusion. Just as a state’s religious authority can
have ramifications for non-religious spheres of political life – helping cultivate Fadli’s
civic nationalism, say, or leading Zainal to focus his activist zeal on what were, for
him, ‘non-religious’ matters – so its handling of ostensibly non-religious affairs, such
as government transparency or economic management, can, through the production
of particular kinds of subject, set the conditions of possibility for the degree of religious
authority it is able to wield. Though analytically distinct – because embedded in quite
different ethical infrastructures – a state’s religious andnon-religiousmodesof authority
are imbricated with, and constitutive of, each other in complex ways.
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Universitas Riau, and STISIPOL Raja Haji. Thanks to Elizabeth Hallam, my anonymous reviewers, and
audiences at the LSE ‘Brown Bag’ and LSE Southeast Asia Centre seminars, for their incredibly valuable
suggestions for improvements. Responsibility for any shortcomings is mine alone.
1 All names are pseudonyms except those of public figures.
2 Indonesia’s constitution declares a belief in ‘one Supreme God’; six monotheistic religions are state-
sanctioned.
3 Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s largest reformist/modernist organization, has only 5,000 members in
Tanjung Pinang.
4 Sani was 69 years old at the time. He died five years later, and less than two months after his re-election,
on 8 April 2016.
5 Constitutionally, regional governments have no legislative authority over religious affairs. Few of my
informants were aware this was the case, however, and indeed it has not prevented many districts from
incorporating the Sharia into their byelaws.
6 A few informants also invoked ‘national togetherness’ to justify following Suryadharma’s edict.
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De l’autorite´ islamique de l’E´tat indone´sien : responsabilite´, soupc¸on et actes
de conformite´
Re´sume´
L’article examine la manie`re dont les efforts de l’E´tat indone´sien pour se donner l’image d’une autorite´
islamique ont influence´ le comportement des Indone´siens musulmans. L’auteur pre´sente des cas dans
lesquels lesmusulmansdes ıˆlesRiau se conforment auxdirectives islamiquesde l’E´tat pour transfe´rer a` celui-
ci la responsabilite´ de leurs actes, et montre comment cette pratique peut soutenir la gouvernementalite´
islamique, renforcer le nationalisme et brider l’activisme pour les droits civiques. Il est inte´ressant de noter
que les citoyens peuvent se conformer a` des directives envers lesquelles ils sont pourtant tre`s re´ticents,
ce qui conduit a` se demander si le soupc¸on est ne´cessairement hostile a` l’autorite´. L’auteur conclut que
l’autorite´ islamique d’un de´cret s’articule sur la manie`re dont les musulmans abordent les soupc¸ons qui le
concernent et que, pour les insulaires des ıˆles Riau, l’urgence du soupc¸on a e´te´ tempe´re´e par des mode`les
culturels de personnalite´, de subjectivite´ individuelle, et par l’opacite´ morale de l’Indone´sie post-Suharto.
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